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the most important issue is not reflected in the
title of this panel—what to do in the event of
financial crisis—but instead how to avoid finan-
cial crisis in the first place.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments, especially Robert H. Rasche, senior vice
president and director of Research and William
R. Emmons, senior economist. However, I retain
full responsibility for errors.
AVOIDING FINANCIAL CRISIS
Deposit insurance and a broader, fuzzy, safety
net for financial firms creates an incentive for
firms to take too much risk and hold too little
capital. That is a fact of life. I believe that we
should continue to seek reforms to the deposit
insurance system. I am particularly fond of pro-
posals that would establish a formal policy of
“haircutting” the insurance coverage to, say, 90
percent of insured liabilities and/or requiring that
insured financial institutions issue explicitly
uninsured long-term subordinated debt. Such
reforms would administer a healthy dose of mar-
ket discipline to financial firms. But until such
reforms are put in place, I do not see any other
option than maintaining substantial supervisory
oversight of large, systemically important finan-
cial institutions. The supervisors need to have
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am delighted to return to Cato, an organi-
zation with which I feel a natural affinity,
especially through Bill Niskanen with
whom I served as a member of the Council
of Economic Advisers a quarter century ago.
That sounds like a long time ago, and I guess it
was. However, when it comes to the subject of
this panel, I do not think much has changed. The
key issue then, as today, is time inconsistency.
It seems to make sense in the middle of a finan-
cial crisis for someone to bail out a failing firm
or firms. However, the inconsistency is that,
however sensible a bailout seems in the heat of
crisis, bailouts rarely make sense as a standard
element of policy. The reason is simple: Firms,
expecting aid if they end up in trouble, hold too
little capital and take too many risks. As every
economist understands, a policy of bailing out
failing firms will increase the number of financial
crises and the number of bailouts. Along the way,
the policy also encourages inefficient risk-
management decisions by firms.
In writing the previous paragraph, I at first
began by saying, “Everyone knows that a policy
of bailouts will increase their number.” But here
we are in Washington, and a cursory examination
of federal policy proves that not everyone knows.
Federal disaster relief policy is exhibit A, but
every company, financial or otherwise, knows
that if it gets into trouble it is at least worth a
major effort to attempt to secure a bailout because
there is always a significant probability of suc-
cess. Given this state of affairs, in place for many
decades despite economists’ pleadings, I thinkthe authority to require adequate capital and
maintenance of robust risk-management policies
in financial firms.
I believe that supervisory oversight is in
pretty good shape, with one glaring exception.
Government-sponsored enterprises are not ade-
quately capitalized and the supervisory powers
of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OHFEO) are inadequate. I’ll concen-
trate on the housing GSEs—Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. This is a topic I’ve addressed several
times in the past (Poole, 2003 and 2004) and I’ll
not repeat those arguments in any detail here.
Although the GSEs are not formally insured by
the federal government, the market clearly
believes that they are effectively backstopped.
As I’ve emphasized before, the Federal Reserve
does not have the legal authority to bail out a
troubled GSE. The Fed can provide liquidity
support through its discount window, but only
indirectly through collateralized loans to banks
that would then bear the credit risk of making
loans to a troubled firm. Under emergency con-
ditions, the Fed does have the authority to make
loans directly to a GSE, but the loans must be
fully collateralized. The Fed is obviously disin-
clined to use its emergency powers to lend to
firms other than banks; despite numerous finan-
cial upsets over the years, the Fed has not used
this authority since the 1930s.
Given the obvious moral hazard facing the
GSEs, the first best solution would be to turn the
GSEs into fully private firms subject to normal
market disciplines and with no special connec-
tion to the federal government. Absent that step,
what supervisory policy actions could reduce
the threat they pose to financial stability? The
two items of highest priority are, first, that the
GSEs’ portfolios should be limited in both scope
and scale to assets with a clear public purpose;
and,second,capitalattheGSEsshouldbehigher—
substantially higher. As I have argued before, the
capital standards applied to the GSEs are simply
inconsistent with the interest rate risks the firms
have assumed. It does not make sense for public
policy to permit GSEs to hold far less capital than
required in large banks given that GSEs have
substantially similar or even greater risks than
large banks.
Finally, Congress should create a prompt
corrective action (PCA) policy regime for the
GSEs that truly mimics the one that was intro-
duced into U.S. banking law 15 years ago.1 The
idea behind PCA is simple—if a regulated firm
holds only a small buffer of capital to protect the
firm’s debt holders from loss, it is critically impor-
tant that the firm face immediate and increasingly
stringent restrictions on its activities as its capital
dwindles. Otherwise, an undercapitalized firm
experiences even stronger incentives to exploit
its unpriced real or perceived guarantees.
The PCA regime is well established for banks
but the situation for the housing GSEs is not so
clear. Unfortunately, OFHEO did not publish a
final rule implementing its version of PCA until
2002, and even now OFHEO lacks the legal author-
ity to impose the ultimate PCA sanction on a
critically undercapitalized GSE, namely, closure
of the institution and appointment of a receiver.
Thus, the promise of PCA for reducing risks to
financial stability posed by the GSEs remains
unfulfilled. New legislation should provide the
GSEs’ supervisor with clear and credible receiver-
ship authority. Carried out faithfully, a distressed
GSE would be subject to a PCA regime of phased
early intervention (including prompt closure, if
warranted) and required recapitalization.2
The PCA regime has a major advantage for
regulators in that they are instructed by law not
to engage in regulatory forbearance, the source of
some of the problems that eventually led to the
collapse of numerous savings institutions in the
1980s and early 1990s. The only way to deal with
time inconsistency is to make bailouts unlikely
FINANCIAL MARKETS
2
1 The statutory authority for prompt corrective action applied to depository institutions is found in the 1991 Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) at 12 USC 18310; for the GSEs, it is in the 1992 Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and
Soundness Act (FHEFSSA) at 12 USC 4611 through 4623.
2 For evidence that the PCA regime has been effective in minimizing the FDIC’s losses at banks, see Aggarwal and Jacques (1998).by tying the hands of regulators. Taking away the
power to provide a bailout permits regulators to
put more pressure on firms earlier. Moreover, in
the absence of regulatory discretion, firms know
that a bailout requires a successful approach
directly to Congress, which might or might not
be successful. Uncertainty over congressional
action adds to market discipline.
The Fed’s role in contributing to general
financial stability through a policy of maintaining
price stability is also important. Historically,
periods of restrictive monetary policy designed
to bring inflation down have often been accom-
panied by failures of many financial and other
firms. The Fed also contributes to general finan-
cial stability by cushioning disturbances to
employment and output. The Fed cannot make
the economy recession-proof but it can reduce
the severity of recessions.
Some have argued that the Fed’s success in
stabilizing inflation at a relatively low level and
moderating recessions during the period since
the early Volcker years has actually made the
financial system less stable. The argument is that
a more stable economy reduces risk and makes
financial firms more willing to pursue risky
strategies, just as flood-control projects actually
increase flood losses by encouraging people to
build on flood plains. Eventually, a large flood
overwhelms the defenses, the floodplain is inun-
dated and those who thought it safe to build on
the flood plain suffer large losses.
I believe that there is an important difference
between flood control experience and the effect of
greater macroeconomic stability. Macroeconomic
stability does not eliminate risk from microeco-
nomic adjustments. In our vigorously competitive
economy, one firm can take market share from
another, creating risks and opportunities for both
firms, without affecting aggregate economic
activity. Diversification across firms can reduce
portfolio risk for individual investors without
affecting the incentives individual competitive
firms have to manage their risks appropriately.
In fact, reducing macroeconomic risk, such
as risk from currency instability through counter-
feiting or generalized inflation, permits firms to
concentrate on managing their own inherent
business risks more effectively. In the flood con-
trol case, individuals and firms make mistakes
because of poor estimates of flood risks and the
expectation of compensation should there be a
flood. Unlike that case, firms’ responses to a more
stable macroeconomic environment improve
productivity because they concentrate on busi-
ness risks they can affect rather than on macro-
economic risks beyond their control. I know of
no convincing arguments that the Fed could
improve productivity and growth by deliberately
introducing random disturbances to the economy.
If that point is accepted, then the converse must
also be true—reducing macroeconomic instability
improves economic efficiency. Of course, there
is an important corollary: If the Fed fails to main-
tain price stability after achieving it and creating
expectations of its permanence, then the disrup-
tion to the economy from renewed inflation will
be considerable precisely because firms ceased
to plan for such an event. Unlike the situation
with natural variability of rainfall, however, infla-
tion is controllable and not inevitable.
DEALING WITH FINANCIAL
UPSETS
Now for the topic of the panel. What should
the Fed do when financial instability strikes?
In most cases, nothing. The important prin-
ciple here is support for the market mechanism
rather than support for individual firms. The Fed
has, appropriately, permitted many highly visible
firms to fail without any attempt to provide sup-
port, or even any particular comment except to
say that it does not intend to intervene.
Of course, the Fed has intervened from time
to time. One important case was the provision of
additional liquidity and moral support to the
markets when the stock market crashed in 1987.
The Fed also provided support to the market at
the time of the near failure of Long Term Capital
Management in 1998. In both cases the Fed cut
the federal funds rate, which provided evidence
to the markets that the Fed was on the job and
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realize that the Fed’s presence in the negotia-
tions for additional financial support for LTCM
from other firms is controversial; I would simply
emphasize that the Fed itself did not provide any
financial support and, in my opinion, would not
have done so if the effort to encourage support
from other firms had failed.
Some observers have viewed the large expan-
sion of hedge funds as a rising danger to financial
stability, requiring additional regulation and Fed
readiness to intervene. I myself believe the dangers
of systemic problems from hedge fund failures
are vastly overrated. The hedge fund industry is
indeed large but it is also highly diverse and
competitive. Many and perhaps most of the large
positions taken by individual firms have other
hedge funds on the opposite side of the transac-
tions. I trust normal market mechanisms to handle
any problems that might arise.
The Fed has not had to face the issue of a
potential large bank failure since enactment of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991. I believe that
the correct principle is that no bank is too large
to fail, although a bank may certainly be too large
to liquidate quickly. As already noted, the Fed
can provide liquidity support but cannot provide
capital to prop up a failing firm. Ultimately, the
only source of capital from the federal govern-
ment, absent new legislation, is from the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp.
A very interesting case arose with the terror-
ist attacks on 9/11. Thinking back to my academic
years before coming to St. Louis, I recall no dis-
cussion or journal articles analyzing the possibil-
ity that the payments system might crash because
of physical destruction. But that is what nearly
happened, because the Bank of New York, a major
clearing bank, was disabled when the twin towers
came down. Moreover, trading closed in the U.S.
Treasury and equity markets, and banks were
unable to transfer funds because the Bank of New
York was not functioning. With normal sources
of liquidity shut down, many banks faced the
prospect of being unable to meet their obligations.
The Fed’s provision of funds through the dis-
count window and in other ways prevented a
cascading of defaults around the world. No pri-
vate entity would have been able to provide liq-
uidity on such a massive scale.
I do not know what a totally unanticipated
future systemic shock might be but am sure that
the Fed needs to be ready to respond, and to some
extent, invent the appropriate response on the
fly to a currently unimaginable shock. That is
surely what a central bank is for, among other
things. At the same time, a great reluctance to
intervene will serve the economy well in the
long run.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I can summarize my position very succinctly.
The Fed has a responsibility above all to maintain
price stability and general macroeconomic sta-
bility to reduce the likelihood of economic con-
ditions that would be conducive to financial
instability. Included in this responsibility is pro-
vision of advice to Congress on needed legislative
action to deal with possible risks. The largest of
these risks on my radar screen arises from the
thin capital positions maintained by government-
sponsored enterprises and the ambiguity of
whether Congress would or would not act to bail
out a troubled firm. The time to deal with poten-
tial financial instability caused by structural weak-
nesses of the GSEs and their regulatory regime is
before instability strikes. The steps I outlined
earlier would go a long way to improve prospects
for sustained financial stability in coming years.
Although prevention is the most important
of the Fed’s responsibilities, without question the
Fed needs to be prepared to provide liquidity
support should markets be in danger of ceasing
to function. We know a lot about this subject and
have in place deep contingency arrangements to
assure that the Fed itself will remain operational
at all times. I do not see any way that these func-
tions could be privatized; I believe the markets
do have confidence that the Fed has necessary
legal authority and the internal strength to act as
necessary. That said, the Fed’s reluctance to act
is also an important element of strength.
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